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Introduction
Lessons from health technology assessment (HTA) organizations
around the world are emerging, and only some of them are about
evidence. Other lessons pertain to governance, communication,
trust, politics, and the persistence of local “practice patterns” for
evidence evaluations. This should not come as a surprise. HTA
organizations worldwide have different constituencies and orga-
nizational structures, and exist amid different cultural traditions,
political systems, and ﬁscal climates.
European versus American HTA
Broadly speaking, health technology assessment to inform health
policy decisions has received a more favorable reception in
Europe than in the United States, although to be sure, controver-
sies persist in Europe and the receptivity to HTA varies across the
continent. In general, the idea of establishing public HTA orga-
nizations has been a more natural ﬁt with the more centralized,
government-funded, and administered health-care systems of
Europe.
European sensibilities on HTA are evident in the European
Union Commission’s High Level Group on Health Services and
Medical Care conclusion in November 2004 that, “HTA has
become a political priority and there is an urgent need for
establishing a sustainable European network for HTA” [1]. The
EUnetHTA that was created as a result was envisioned as a
sustainable European Network for Health Technology Assess-
ment to inform policy decisions, and to connect public national
HTA agencies, research institutions, and health ministries,
enabling an exchange of information and support of policy deci-
sions by member states [1]. With over 60 partners (including
national and regional HTA agencies, as well as research institu-
tions, international organizations, such as the Cochrane Collabo-
ration), it reﬂects a government-focused vision for the usefulness
of HTA (although it should be noted that neither EUnetHTA nor
its members are actual government employees in most countries).
Within Europe, differences in practices exist across HTA
organizations [2–4]. Some agencies are much more transparent
than others about their deliberations, for example. There are also
differences in terms of how HTA organizations set priorities, the
degree to which stakeholders are permitted to provide input, how
results are communicated, how HTA organizations interact with
national reimbursement authorities, and how explicitly entities
use decision analytic models and cost-effectiveness analysis.
As just one example, policymakers in northern European
countries, such as The Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, have been more enthusiastic users of cost per quality-
adjusted life-year thresholds than their counterparts in central
and southern Europe. Even among the countries using cost-
effectiveness analyses, local experts have expressed different pre-
ferences for certain methodologies (e.g., the inclusion of friction
costs in cost-effectiveness analyses in The Netherlands) [5].
American traditions and the American health-care environ-
ment have created a different climate for HTA in the United
States [6]. The current economic crisis notwithstanding, cross-
national surveys have consistently revealed that Americans gen-
erally tend to favor less government control compared to citizens
of Western European countries [7]. Compared to Europe, the
United States has a more privately oriented and decentralized
health-care system, with signiﬁcantly more cost sharing for its
citizens [8].
The idea of centralized “big-government” HTA has histori-
cally received a much more hostile reception in the United States.
A National Center for Health Care Technology existed for a
short time but was eliminated by the Reagan administration in
the early 1980s [9,10]. The Congressional Ofﬁce of Technology
Assessment, which conducted numerous and generally well-
regarded health technology assessments, was removed by the
Republican Congress elected in 1994. The Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality was threatened with extinction in the
1990s in part because of what was perceived as overly prescrip-
tive clinical practice guidelines [11,12].
The American HTA organizations that have evolved and even
ﬂourished in this inhospitable environment are a varied lot, char-
acterized by a strong private sector inﬂuence and carefully
bounded authority. Large private health plans, such as Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, Kaiser Permanente, and Aetna have developed
their own health technology expertise and practices. Private
organizations conducting HTA for the marketplace, such as
ECRI Institute and Hayes, Inc., are also well established. Smaller
private health plans rely on external expertise, but also conduct
their own assessments, which tend to be opaque affairs, with no
open meetings or appeals processes or published minutes about
the rationale underlying decisions.
Public HTA organizations in the United States exist but play
a circumscribed role, focusing on clinical (not economic) evi-
dence and tailoring assessments to the populations under the
agency’s purview. They tend to be more open and explicit than
private HTA organizations about their processes and delibera-
tions. Examples include evidence reviews conducted by the
federal Medicare program, which evaluates 10 to 15 national
coverage decisions each year and posts decisions and the ratio-
nale underlying them on the Medicare website [13]. Similarly, the
drug class reviews conducted by the Drug Effectiveness Review
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Project, an alliance of 14 state Medicaid agencies and several
nonproﬁts that produce evidence reports, are available on its
website [14].
The American landscape, thus, holds some unique challenges
for HTA organizations, given the decentralized and privately
based health-care system, the multitude of health plans, and
different cultural attitudes toward the appropriate role of gov-
ernment. Arguably, stakeholders—one might call them “interest
groups”—hold more sway in the United States than elsewhere,
which make public HTA initiatives more challenging to imple-
ment. As others have argued, the United States is characterized
by “deliberatively obstruction-oriented political structure” that
frustrates government programs, even if they reﬂect popular
aspirations and values [15,16]. Advancing HTA in this climate
will require a delicate balancing act.
Achieving Balance/Future Directions
Needs of Stakeholder
Despite regional differences, the needs of HTA stakeholders
worldwide are, by and large, universal. Payers want an evidence-
based and politically acceptable process that balances efforts to
increase access to effective new technologies against ﬁscal con-
straints. Manufacturers desire transparency, timeliness, and a
reasonable degree of predictability. That is, to the extent possible,
they want to reduce uncertainty around HTA, so that they under-
stand the “rules of the road” and can plan accordingly.
To be sure, all HTA organizations profess to make evidence-
based judgments. Moreover, thanks to the Internet, all have rapid
access to the same published evidence (and often to the same or
similar unpublished evidence). Still, guidance is needed to ensure
that HTA organizations adhere to good evaluation practices and
are accountable to their constituents.
Guidance for HTA organizations worldwide might be divided
roughly into two categories: evidence-related lessons and non-
evidence-related lessons. In terms of evidence, HTA institutions
have always grappled with questions of how to synthesize and
make sense of the totality of available information, particularly
information from nonrandomized sources, and information
about the economic value of medical care [17]. If the modern era
of evidence evaluation matured in the 1960s to 1980s with the
advent of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and the beginnings
of formal efforts to integrate evidence from nonrandomized
sources, the ﬁeld might be said to have entered a postmodern era
in the last decade or so, characterized by more sophisticated
attempts to synthesize the clinical evidence and to measure value
and cost-effectiveness explicitly. Looking ahead, policymakers
should keep three areas at the forefront of HTA: focusing
on value and economic efﬁciency, incorporating real-world
data; and developing better procedural rules around HTA
implementation.
Focusing on Value and Economic Efﬁciency
Worldwide, there has been a steady, if somewhat uneven, march
towards the formal consideration of cost-effectiveness in HTAs.
In Europe, some countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, The Neth-
erlands) have well-established procedures for considering cost-
effectiveness in reimbursement decisions, while others (e.g.,
France) do not consider health economic information formally,
although cost-effectiveness analysis may be recommended in
manufacturers’ submissions [2].
In the United States, while there has been some progress, the
trend toward using cost-effectiveness analysis has been slower to
develop. American HTA organizations tend to separate the evalu-
ation of clinical evidence from economic evidence. This is
explained as a political accommodation in a country where open
consideration of cost-effectiveness remains largely anathema
[18]. Unlike many of their European counterparts, American
policymakers have been reluctant to use cost-effectiveness analy-
sis openly, which likely reﬂects cultural and political inﬂuences,
and, at least in part, the absence of a national health-care system
which mitigates against the consideration of societal resource
allocation decisions [18]. Nevertheless, US health policymakers
in the private and public sectors continue in quieter fashion to
develop strategies to use evidence of comparative value, striving
to balance ﬁscal realities while avoiding the charge that they are
explicitly rationing needed care [19]. For example, the US Medi-
care program has undertaken a number of projects that make
use of cost-effectiveness information to inform coverage and
payment policy, although not to deny services out rightly [20].
For payers worldwide, open consideration of economic efﬁ-
ciency raises challenges. Nevertheless, the lack of procedures for
considering economic evidence forthrightly also creates prob-
lems. It contributes to mistrust, because observers assume that
costs are considered surreptitiously in reviews. Considering costs
separate from the clinical review tends to focus ultimate reim-
bursement decisions on a drug’s price rather than its overall value
[21]. Questions about the value of health-care strategies are best
considered in an evaluation in which clinical and economic evi-
dence are combined simultaneously.
The debate about appropriate HTA practices would beneﬁt
from more openness and clarity about cost-effectiveness. It
would also proﬁt from a broader discussion of the value of
health-care strategies, including diagnostic tests, medical proce-
dures, and care delivery, rather than a narrow focus on drugs and
devices. Finally, the debate on value would beneﬁt from attention
to the need for disinvestment of inefﬁcient technologies, as well
as investment in efﬁcient ones [2].
Incorporating Real-World Data
The international medical community has long recognized that
RCTs, while providing a gold standard of efﬁcacy evidence, are
of limited generalizability, typical community-based medical
practice, and are expensive to conduct [22]. Efforts are underway
to formalize the collection and evaluation of “real world” data,
sometimes described as data for decision-making that are not
collected in conventional RCTs. As the recent International
Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research
(ISPOR) Task Force on Real World Data emphasized, sources of
data other than from RCTs can contribute to the evidence base in
important ways by demonstrating how drugs and devices work
under conditions or in populations not studied in trial, or relative
to interventions not included in the study [22].
Despite these developments, there is a need for more clarity
about which methods and data to use to answer particular ques-
tions [23]. A particular challenge relates to how to pool data
from nonrandomized sources. Studies have shown that even for
the pooling of data from randomized trials in meta-analyses, data
extraction techniques can be prone to errors that can negate or
even reverse the ﬁndings of the study [24,25].
Good Process Matters
Finally, there are a number of non–evidence-related lessons that
involve the importance of good “process” for technology evalu-
ations. The notion of “best practices” for conducting health
technology assessment continues to evolve, although consensus is
coalescing around several dimensions [26]. Good process means
independence for those conducting assessments; transparency
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about the criteria used to judge evidence as well as the evaluation
decisions and the rationale underlying them; openness about the
composition of the committees performing assessments; explicit
timelines for completing assessments; opportunities for stake-
holder input; and clear rules for appealing decisions.
Furthermore, a key recent process innovation relates to the
registration of RCTs. Many medical journals now require in-
vestigators to deposit information about trial design into an
accepted clinical trials registry before patient enrollment begins
[27]. The idea is to ensure that information about the existence
and design of clinically directive trials are publicly available in
order to alleviate concerns about bias. Despite concerns about
the burden of such a requirement, the response has been very
strong: ClinicalTrials.gov, for example, contained 40,000 trials
as of April 2007 with 200 new trial registrations weekly [27]. A
key question for the future—and one that could help bolster the
integrity of HTAs—is whether registries can extend to nonran-
domized evidence and even decision analytic models. Possibly,
such evidence can be registered before studies are begun, or at
least data and models can be made available on the Web in some
form for those who want to analyze them.
A ﬁnal point concerns the importance of trust and good
communication between HTA organizations and product manu-
facturers. Some friction between drug companies and HTA orga-
nization about the content and process surrounding evidence
evaluations will always exist. Nevertheless, statements that one
often hears suggest a wide gulf:
Things drug company ofﬁcials often say about HTAs:
• Evidence-based medicine is code for cost containment;
• HTA organizations care only about RCTs;
• Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence;
• HTA organizations ignore my models; and
• HTA processes are not transparent.
Things HTA ofﬁcials often say about (and to) drug
companies:
• We are focused on value not on costs;
• We do use nonrandomized evidence;
• We don’t trust your nonrandomized evidence;
• We do not trust your models either; and
• We are more transparent than we used to be.
Of course, HTA organizations and drug company perceptions
about evidence reﬂect their perspectives as evaluators (and some-
times buyers) and sellers, and their different agendas. As American
author and professor of sociolinguistics Deborah Tannen has
pointed out, communication frequently reﬂects tacit agendas [28].
In the case of drug companies and HTA organizations, the con-
versation is about evidence but reﬂects an unspoken conversation
about money and value. HTA organizations want to serve as
responsible ﬁscal stewards; drug companies seek to maximize
shareholder value. What seems notable about the communication
surrounding HTA is the lack of trust on both sides. A reasonable
question is whether we can establish HTAs processes, in which the
discussion is solely about the evidence. For reasons enumerated
above, the answer is almost certainly not entirely. The tacit
agendas will always exist. But more consensus about HTA pro-
cesses would help foster a more open and honest dialogue.
Conclusions
Differences in health systems, political traditions, national
income, and local practice patterns will continue to translate into
HTA differences across countries. We should not be surprised
that HTA organizations worldwide vary on so many dimensions,
that they sometimes reach different conclusions, and that non-
evidentiary factors play an important role. Still, some lessons for
HTA are universal: the need to develop rigorous scientiﬁc evi-
dence evaluations, as well as procedures that are transparent,
fair, predictable, and efﬁcient. There remains considerable room
for improvement in moving HTA towards more predictability
and rationality.
This will, of course, require resources as well as leadership,
not only among government ofﬁcials, but among individuals in
professional organizations, including the ISPOR membership.
The goal should be to improve the science and to reduce uncer-
tainty. Citizens deserve high-quality evidence evaluations, and
those making investment decisions about technology deserve to
know rules of the road.
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